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INTRODUCTION
The federal Freedom of Information Act1 (“FOIA”) is the
most maddeningly cumbersome law one could ever love. As writ-
ten, the FOIA erects a relatively simple process for gaining access
to the wealth of information possessed by the Executive Branch of
the federal government. FOIA is not only an incredibly powerful
resource for anyone wanting to know “what their government is up
to,”2 it can also be a useful tool to uncover information vital to
advocacy and litigation. Frequently, in fact, such as in certain ad-
ministrative proceedings, the FOIA may be the only mechanism
available for obtaining information necessary to protect one’s (or
* Liman Fellow, CASA de Maryland 2008–09; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Wash-
ington University in St. Louis. The author would like to thank Jennifer Bennett for
helpful comments; Mike Wishnie for introducing him to the FOIA and for frequent
guidance regarding its use; and the editors of the New York City Law Review for con-
siderable editing assistance.
1 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), amended by OPEN Govern-
ment Act of 2007, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. II 2008), was signed into law by President
Lyndon B. Johnson on September 6, 1966, and went into effect the following year.
2 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989) (explaining that the “core purpose” of the FOIA is informing citizens
about “what their government is up to”).
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one’s client’s) legal rights.3 But even when alternative procedures
(such as discovery) are available, the FOIA can be used as an effec-
tive supplement4 or as a pre-litigation fact-gathering device.5 Be-
yond the litigation context, government data can be marshaled to
support arguments for policy reform by demonstrating that cur-
rent policies are routinely violated6 or are simply ineffectual.7 In
3 One example is removal (deportation) proceedings in Immigration Court.
While immigration practitioners have long used the FOIA to obtain clients’ “Alien
files,” some advocates have further expanded the use of FOIA in recent years to ob-
tain records—including, for example, sworn statements by arresting officers given
during internal investigations—to impeach government accounts of the circum-
stances surrounding their clients’ arrests. See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman, Conflicting Accounts
of an ICE Raid in Md.: Officers Portray Detention of 24 Latinos Differently in Internal Probe
and in Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2009, at A01; Scott Calvert, Immigration Official Told
Deputy To ‘Make More Arrests,’ ICE Report Says, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2009, at 1A. Cf. Larry
R. Fleurantin, Nowhere to Turn: Illegal Aliens Cannot Use the Freedom of Information Act as a
Discovery Tool to Fight Unfair Removal Hearings, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155
(2008) (arguing that DHS’s practice of withholding asylum interview notes, which are
often used to impeach an alien’s testimony during his or her merits hearing, from the
asylum applicant under FOIA Exemption (b)(5) violates the FOIA and due process).
4 While the FOIA is not intended to supplement discovery, see John Doe Agency v.
John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989), it also does not displace rules of discovery,
see id., and it serves as an independent basis of obtaining information in the posses-
sion of the federal government, see, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 602
(5th Cir. 1977). Even a finding that materials are exempt under the FOIA does not
affect a litigant’s right to compel disclosure of the same information through the
discovery process. See Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336,
1344 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The FOIA acts as a ‘floor’ when discovery of government
documents is sought in the course of civil litigation. Though information available
under the FOIA is likely to be available through discovery, information unavailable
under the FOIA is not necessarily unavailable through discovery.”). See generally ELEC-
TRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERN-
MENT LAWS (Harry A. Hammitt et al. eds., 24th ed. 2008); JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 341–46 (3d ed. 2000); George K. Chamberlin, Use of Freedom
of Information Act as Substitute For, or as Means of, Supplementing Discovery Procedures Avail-
able to Litigants in Federal Civil, Criminal, or Administrative Proceedings, 57 A.L.R. FED. 903
(1982); David I. Levine, Using the Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery Device, 36 BUS.
LAWYER 45 (1980); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discov-
ery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119 (1984).
5 For example, depending on how courts interpret the holdings of Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)—which may or may not impose a heightened pleading standard for cer-
tain types of claims, particularly those involving supervisory liability for civil rights’
violations—the FOIA can be an effective way of ascertaining who knew what and
when.
6 Chris Lasch, for example, has suggested that the Executive Branch’s authority to
issue immigration detainers, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a), is not only ultra vires, see Chris
Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164 (2008), but also that the detainer’s purported authoriza-
tion for holding immigrant detainees, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d), is routinely violated. See,
e.g., Ochoa v. Bass, 181 P.3d 727, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 2008) (granting habeas peti-
tions because “[o]nce the forty-eight (48) hour period granted to ICE [Immigration
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short, the government has enormous amounts of information, and
obtaining it can be crucial to persuading others. The FOIA is a
powerful way of gaining access.
Unfortunately, the actual administration of the FOIA can be
anything but simple, and long processing delays and inadequate
responses can easily frustrate requesters. This Article is directed at
those who wish to better understand the FOIA and those who wish
to more effectively utilize it. It highlights the discrepancy between
what the FOIA promises and what it actually delivers, and suggests
ways FOIA requesters can minimize that gap.
There are a number of valuable resources, both online8 and in
print,9 that detail both the requirements of the FOIA and the pro-
& Customs Enforcement], by 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d), for assumption of custody had
lapsed without ICE taking any action on its detainers, the State no longer had author-
ity to continue to hold Petitioners.”). Data on the frequency of such violations, how-
ever, is exceedingly difficult to obtain even for a single jail facility, See, e.g., Fla.
Immigrant Coal. v. Mendez, No. 09-81280-CIV, 2010 WL 4384220, *8 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
28, 2010) (granting summary judgment to a county sheriff defendant on a Monell
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding his jail’s handling of ICE detainers because
the plaintiffs only had evidence of a “handful” of individuals affected). This is a prob-
lem that could be addressed, at least in part, through the FOIA.
7 For example, in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in deportation (now removal) proceed-
ings, based in part on the fact that allegations of Fourth Amendment violations were
rare and the apparent efficacy of the INS’ scheme for deterring such misconduct. See
id. at 1044. Nonetheless, a plurality of the Court indicated that it might reconsider “if
there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS
officers were widespread.” Id. at 1050. Some advocates have argued that this time has
come. See Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations
in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008
Wis. L. Rev. 1109. Ms. Burch Elias has marshaled an impressive amount of evidence in
support of this argument, but further factual support could be developed through the
FOIA by, for example, requesting records related to motions to suppress, civil rights
complaints filed, claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, etc.
8 See, e.g., The Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010)
[hereinafter DOJ Guide to the FOIA]; FOIA Reference Guide (2010), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/04_3.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010); Freedom
of Information Center, Nat’l Freedom of Info. Coalition, http://www.nfoic.org/foi-
center (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter “NFOIC”]; NATIONAL SECURITY
ARCHIVE, EFFECTIVE FOIA REQUESTING FOR EVERYONE (2008), available at http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_full.pdf; REPORTER’S COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT GUIDE (Corinna J. Zarek ed., 10th
ed. 2009), available at http://www.rcfp.org/fogg/.
9 See, e.g., P. STEPHEN GIDIERE III, THE FEDERAL INFORMATION MANUAL: HOW THE
GOVERNMENT COLLECTS, MANAGES, AND DISCLOSES INFORMATION UNDER FOIA AND
OTHER STATUTES (2006); JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE RIGHT TO KNOW: YOUR GUIDE TO
USING AND DEFENDING FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2009);
LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4; JAMES T.
O’REILLY, supra note 4.
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cess for invoking it. Therefore, this Article will only discuss the
mechanics of the FOIA where necessary. Section I, by way of back-
ground, provides a brief explanation of the FOIA, as it is actually
written, while Section II discusses how—and, to some extent,
why—the reality of FOIA administration does not reflect the statu-
tory mandates. Section III explores a few ways that requesters can
try to mitigate those shortcomings in drafting and litigating FOIA
requests by leveraging other available sources of information. Sec-
tion IV discusses the FOIA’s state-law counterparts, including ways
that they can be used to complement and amplify the utility of the
FOIA. Finally, the Conclusion offers some hope for future improve-
ments in government transparency.
I. WHAT THE FOIA PROMISES
The FOIA permits access to records10 of virtually every part of
the federal Executive Branch, including its departments, agencies,
boards, commissions, and government-controlled corporations.11
10 An agency record is essentially anything reproducible over which an agency has
possession and control, no matter the format in which the record is maintained. See
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989). See also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(f)(2)(A) (2006). See generally LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERN-
MENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 259–78. The FOIA amendments of 2007 added to the
definition of “records” those “maintained for an agency by an entity under Govern-
ment contract, for the purposes of records management.” Openness Promotes Effec-
tiveness in our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 9, 121 Stat.
2524, 2528-29 (2007) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)(B)) [hereinafter “OPEN
Government Act of 2007”]. Physical objects that cannot be reproduced (such as soil
samples) are not considered a record under the FOIA. See DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra
note 8, at 33 (“The FOIA applies to ‘records,’ not tangible, evidentiary objects.” (cita-
tion omitted)). It is also well-established that agencies are not required to create
records in response to a FOIA request. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980) (“The [FOIA] does not obligate agencies to
create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it
in fact has created and retained.”).
11 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (defining “agency” as “any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the Executive Branch of the Government (including the Executive
Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency”). Among the entities
not covered by the FOIA are Congress and the federal judiciary, certain personnel
and units of the Executive Office of the President. See LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 254–56. Federally-funded state agencies,
state, and local governments do not fall within the FOIA’s definition of an agency. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1). Additionally, some federal entities do not, for some reason or
another, fit the FOIA’s definition of an “agency” and thus are not covered by the
FOIA. See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the U.S. Sentencing Commission does not count as an
“agency”). In Fiscal Year 2008, 77 agencies and the 15 executive departments com-
pleted annual FOIA reports, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(1). These annual re-
ports are available on the U.S. Department of Justice Web site. See Annual FOIA Reports
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To gain access to government records, one must merely send a re-
quest letter—or, increasingly, an email12—to the relevant govern-
ment entity. So long as the request “reasonably describes” the
information sought,13 the FOIA requires the agency to make a de-
termination on the request within 20 business days.14 Requesters
are generally responsible for the cost of searching for and copying
records,15 but fee waivers are available to a broad class of reques-
ters.16 Moreover, under 2007 amendments to the FOIA, if an
agency does not abide by any of the statute’s deadlines, it cannot
charge the requester search fees; in some circumstances, it cannot
charge duplication fees either.17
The statute does provide nine “exemptions” to disclosure,18
but they are mostly discretionary19 and are “narrowly construed.”20
Submitted by Federal Departments and Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/oip/fy08.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (collecting all annual FOIA reports).
12 See Principal FOIA Contacts at Federal Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/oip/foiacontacts.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(i). A FOIA request should be specific enough that a
government employee familiar with the subject area can locate the records with rea-
sonable effort. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 6 (1974). Even when precisely identified,
courts will sometimes uphold an agency’s refusal to fulfill a FOIA request if doing so
would be “unreasonably burdensome.” See, e.g., Dale v. IRS, 238 F. Supp. 2d 99,
104–05 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that a request must “permit an [agency] employee to
locate the records with a ‘reasonable amount of effort,’” and that the plaintiff’s re-
quest “amounted to an all-encompassing fishing expedition . . . at taxpayer expense.”
(citation omitted)); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 2782 v. Dep’t of Commerce,
907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (requiring an agency to make a “determination” in
response to a FOIA request within 20 working days). In some circumstances, expe-
dited processing is available. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i). Under “unusual circumstances,”
however, an agency may extend the deadline for responding by an additional ten
business days. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i).
15 Id. § 552(a)(4)(A).
16 See id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).
17 See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 6, 121 Stat. 2524,
2526 (2007) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(viii)). For a critical look at the
most recent amendments to the FOIA, see Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps
Transparency: Why the OPEN Government Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPEC-
TUS 427 (2008), available at http://commlaw.cua.edu//articles/v16/16.2/Halstuk.
pdf.
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)–(9). In addition to the exemptions, there are also three
“exclusions” from the requirements of the FOIA. Id. §§ 552(c)(1)–(3). For more on
exclusions, see LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4,
at 335–40; DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 671–83.
19 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (“Congress did not design
the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.”); Bartholdi Cable Co. v.
FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“FOIA’s exemptions simply permit, but do
not require, an agency to withhold exempted information . . . .”). An exception to
exemptions being discretionary is when a statute prohibits disclosure, such as the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000). See also
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The presumption remains, at all times, that agency records are to
be disclosed.21 Even when an agency chooses to invoke an exemp-
tion to shield information from disclosure, it may withhold only
that information to which the exemption applies, providing all
“reasonably segregable” portions of that record to the requester.22
Finally, the FOIA provides that dissatisfied requesters may ad-
ministratively appeal decisions denying any part of their request.23
If that does not lead to a satisfactory resolution, requesters can seek
judicial review in federal district court;24 if they do so and substan-
tially prevail,25 requesters are entitled to reimbursement of their
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.26
Brown, 441 U.S. at 293 n.14 (comparing FOIA to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2006)).
20 Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)
(quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982)).
21 See, e.g., Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. at 7–8 (“[T]hese limited exemptions do
not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of
the Act.”).
22 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Thus, for example, if only a portion of a record falls within an
exemption, the agency must redact just that part and disclose the remainder. See gener-
ally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(“The focus in the FOIA is information, not documents, and an agency cannot justify
withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt
material.”).
23 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Agencies have twenty business days to adjudicate
administrative appeals. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). A requester must file an administrative
appeal before proceeding to federal court—i.e., they must administratively exhaust
their remedies—but if the agency has not responded to a FOIA request or an admin-
istrative appeal within the twenty-day timeframe, the requester has constructively ex-
hausted. See id. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i).
24 Id. § 552(a)(4)(B). Under the FOIA, venue is proper in the U.S. district where
the requester resides, where the records are located, or the District of Columbia. Be-
cause venue is always proper in the District Court of the District of Columbia, most
FOIA caselaw comes out of the D.C. Circuit. In the 2008 calendar year, a little over
40% of all FOIA cases brought nationwide were filed in the District Court of the
District of Columbia. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL FOIA LITIGATION AND COMPLIANCE
REPORT: LIST OF FOIA CASES RECEIVED IN 2008 (2009), available at http://www.justice.
gov/oip/08received.htm [hereinafter LIST OF FOIA CASES RECEIVED IN 2008]. Al-
though this means that judges on the District Court of the District of Columbia and
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals have accumulated expertise on FOIA, this is not
always to the benefit of those challenging an agency denial; would-be litigants are
therefore encouraged to consider the full array of possible venues. See LITIGATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 359–60; Seth F.
Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1011, 1049–52 (2008).
25 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii) (defining “substantially prevail[ ]”).
26 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held
that the “catalyst theory”—whereby the bringing of a lawsuit is reasonably perceived
as having caused an opposing party to voluntarily change position, even though the
court had not yet rendered a judgment—is not a permissible basis for the award of
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In addition, agencies are not to wait for requests to make in-
formation available; the FOIA requires each agency to make cer-
tain proactive disclosures available on their websites27—in
particular, those records agencies should know will be of general
interest to the public.28
In sum, the FOIA provides extremely broad access to nearly all
replicable information in the possession or control of the Execu-
tive Branch. Access is guaranteed by short deadlines for agency re-
sponses, a strong presumption of disclosure, and a private right of
action subsidized by the right to reasonable attorneys’ fees for pre-
vailing parties.
II. WHAT THE FOIA DELIVERS
Unfortunately, as even Congress has recognized, the realities
of the FOIA do not deliver all that the statute promises.29 Although
attorney’s fees under either the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006), or the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006). Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at
605–610. Instead, the Court said that a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal rela-
tionship of the parties” was needed for a “prevailing party” to be eligible for attorney’s
fees. Id. at 605. Subsequent to Buckhannon, two Circuit Courts extended its rationale
to deny attorney’s fees to plaintiffs in FOIA cases where the agencies had “voluntarily”
disclosed the requested records after suit was filed, but before they were ordered to
do so. See Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emp.’s, AFL-CIO, CLC v. INS, 336
F.3d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 2003); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t of
Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 453–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The OPEN Government Act of 2007
explicitly restored the catalyst theory to FOIA cases. See Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4, 121
Stat. 2524, 2525 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)); S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 6
(2007) (“[This section of the bill is intended] to clarify that a complainant has sub-
stantially prevailed in a FOIA lawsuit, and is eligible to recover attorney fees . . . if the
pursuit of a claim was the catalyst for the voluntary or unilateral change in position by
the opposing party.”); 153 Cong. Rec. S15701-04 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement
of Sen. Leahy).
27 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552) [hereinafter
E-FOIA] require agencies to create online “electronic reading rooms” where com-
monly-requested material can be accessed. As of 2007, however, a substantial number
of agencies still had not complied with E-FOIA requirements. See generally NATIONAL
SECURITY ARCHIVE, FILE NOT FOUND: 10 YEARS AFTER E-FOIA, MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES
ARE DELINQUENT (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB216/e-foia_audit_report.pdf.
28 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (“Each agency, in accordance with published rules,
shall make available for public inspection and copying copies of all records, regardless
of form or format, which have been released to any person under paragraph (3) and
which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have be-
come or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the
same records”).
29 See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 2(5) 121 Stat. 2524,
2524 (“[I]n practice, the Freedom of Information Act has not always lived up to the
ideals of that Act”).
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the purpose of this Article is not to critique the design or adminis-
tration of the FOIA, maximizing the law’s utility requires an aware-
ness of its shortcomings; therefore, I discuss a few of them in this
section.
Two of the most common frustrations in using the FOIA are
long processing times and insufficient responses to requests. As
mentioned, agencies “shall” make a substantive determination on a
FOIA request within 20 business days.30 In reality that deadline is
frequently (and perhaps usually) missed.31 For example, in Fiscal
Year 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)—which
received more than one-sixth of all FOIA requests that year32—re-
ported median processing times of 87 business days for “simple”
requests and 374 for “complex” ones.33 There are approximately
220 business days in a year, so the median complex request was
pending for about a year and nine months when DHS finally
processed it. Even the median request DHS granted “expedited
processing”34 was not processed within the statutorily-mandated
30 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
31 At the end of Fiscal Year 2008, six of the fifteen federal departments had FOIA
requests pending from the 1990s. The single longest-pending FOIA request had been
pending since May 1, 1992; perhaps predictably, it was to the CIA. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, FOIA POST, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA RE-
PORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/
foiapost/2009foiapost16.htm [hereinafter SUMMARY OF 2008 FOIA REPORTS].
32 In Fiscal Year 2008, the federal government as a whole received about 600,000
requests under the FOIA, with DHS responsible for about 109,000 of those. See id.
33 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2008 ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 12 [hereinafter DHS 2008
FOIA REPORT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/pri-
vacy_rpt_foia_2008.pdf. The “simple” and “complex” distinction comes from a provi-
sion of the FOIA stating that “[e]ach agency may promulgate regulations . . .
providing for multitrack processing of requests for records based on the amount of
work or time (or both) involved in processing requests.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(D)(i)
(2006). Somewhat contradictorily, it also says that the creation of multitrack process-
ing “shall not be considered to affect the requirement . . . to exercise due diligence”
in meeting the deadlines for responding to requests. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(D)(iii)
(2006). There is no further statutory guidance as to the criteria for placing a request
in one track or the other, though DHS’s implementing regulations suggest that “the
number of pages involved” may be an additional distinguishing factor. See 6 C.F.R.
§ 5.5(b)(1) (2010). The Senate Report accompanying the 1996 FOIA amendments
that added this provision, see Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 7, 110 Stat. 3048, 3050–51 (1996), says that “[s]imple
requests are those requiring 10 days or less to process,” and states further that
“[u]nder a two-track system some simple requests shall be processed ahead of more
complex ones which may have been received earlier.” S. REP. NO. 104–272, at 17
(1996).
34 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i) (2006).
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timeframe.35 Of course, some of DHS’s 19 component agencies
have better processing times than others,36 but overall, over 40% of
all requests DHS processed in the 2008 fiscal year languished for
more than 400 working days.37
Perhaps just as frustrating for FOIA requesters is receiving a
response that only addresses part of the request or produces far
fewer records than reasonably anticipated. Agencies have the bur-
den to conduct a reasonable search, defined loosely and somewhat
circularly as a search “reasonably calculated” to uncover all docu-
ments responsive to the request.38 But FOIA responses often in-
clude no information about the search that was actually conducted,
leaving requesters to speculate about the search based solely on the
records they received. Like any other FOIA-related decision, the
failure to conduct a reasonable search can be appealed administra-
tively, but the delays in adjudicating appeals can be even longer
than those for initial processing.39
The reasons for these problems are numerous. Although there
is hope that at least some of the reasons can be addressed in the
short term,40 many are endemic to a system with twin goals—trans-
35 DHS 2008 FOIA Report, supra note 33, at 12 (showing median processing times
of 23 business days for expedited requests).
36 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services [hereinafter USCIS], the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and the Office of the Inspector General have partic-
ularly poor response times. See id. at 6. USCIS receives a majority of DHS FOIA re-
quests. See id.
37 Id. at 13–14.
38 Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“It is elementary that
an agency responding to a FOIA request must conduct a search reasonably calculated
to uncover all relevant documents.” (internal citation omitted)). See also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(C) (2006) (“[A]n agency shall make reasonable efforts to search for the
records in electronic form or format, except when such efforts would significantly
interfere with the operation of the agency’s automated information system.”); id.
§ 552(a)(3)(D) (“[T]he term ‘search’ means to review, manually or by automated
means, agency records for the purpose of locating those records which are responsive
to a request.”).
39 DHS’s median response time for administrative appeals in Fiscal Year 2008 was
539 business days. DHS 2008 FOIA Report, supra note 33, at 10.
40 At least one of the reasons—former President George W. Bush’s policy regard-
ing the FOIA—has been reversed by the Obama administration. On October 12,
2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all federal agencies, en-
couraging them, in responding to FOIA requests, to “carefully consider” all “funda-
mental values that are held by our society,” including “safeguarding our national
security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement, protecting sensitive bus-
iness information and . . . personal privacy.” Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attor-
ney Gen. to Heads of All Fed. Dep’ts and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://
www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf. Attorney General Ashcroft assured the agencies that “the
Department of Justice will defend your [FOIA] decisions unless they lack a sound
legal basis . . . .” Id. See also Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Dir., Info.
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parency and short processing times—that are frequently in
conflict.
Since the FOIA applies to virtually every corner of the Execu-
tive Branch, its implementation requires a high degree of decen-
tralization, with thousands of federal employees and contract
personnel making literally millions of FOIA decisions every year.
Supervising them are hundreds, if not thousands, of different indi-
viduals, all working in different agencies and locations, on differ-
ent substantive subject matters, and with different interpretations
of the FOIA’s requirements and different understandings of the
importance of governmental transparency more generally. These
conditions inevitably lead to wide variations in how requests are
handled.
And unlike many other areas of the law where enforcement is
broadly decentralized, only a small fraction of the millions of FOIA
decisions made annually are ever scrutinized by someone with the
power or authority to alter them. Indeed, only about 3% of all
FOIA requests are either appealed administratively41 or litigated in
federal court,42 meaning that for the remaining 97% of all FOIA
requests, the initial determination is also the last one. This reality
undoubtedly has consequences for the incentives and expectations
Sec. Oversight Office, to Dep’ts & Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.
justice.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm (suggesting ways to resist dis-
closure of “information that could be misused to harm the security of our nation and
the safety of our people.”). Attorney General Holder rescinded Attorney General Ash-
croft’s memo and stated that the DOJ would only defend discretionary agency deci-
sions to deny FOIA requests if “the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would
harm an interest protected by one of the statutory exemptions.” Attorney Gen. Memo-
randum for Executive Departments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,878–82 (Oct. 8, 2009).
41 Note that administrative exhaustion is a requirement for filing in federal court.
If the agency does not make a determination within twenty business days of receiving
the request, however, the requester has constructively exhausted and may proceed
immediately to federal court. See supra note 23. Processing delays and the possibility
for constructive exhaustion make it unlikely that all federal FOIA cases involved an
administrative appeal.
42 See LIST OF FOIA CASES RECEIVED IN 2008, supra note 24. The Attorney General is
required to submit this report to Congress each year. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(6). Most of
these cases will likely be dismissed voluntarily once the agency eventually processes
the initial request. In calendar year 2008, there were a total of 227 decisions of some
kind rendered in FOIA cases, but only 108 of those involved a judgment for either
party, with the remainder being dismissals; a significant number of the dismissals were
stipulated. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2008 CALENDAR YEAR REPORT ON DEP’T OF JUSTICE
FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT LITIGATION ACTIVITIES: LIST OF FOIA CASES IN WHICH A DECI-
SION WAS RENDERED IN 2008, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/08decisions.htm.
Attorneys’ fees were only awarded in five cases, for a grand total of about $230,000. Id.
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of the FOIA officers making the disclosure decisions.43 Further ex-
acerbating the situation is that the same FOIA officers are under
pressure to reduce the substantial backlogs of requests that have
built up over the last several years.44 Together, these two factors—
the general absence of third-party review coupled with institutional
demands to not only respond timely to incoming FOIA requests,
but to reduce the accumulated backlog—lead predictably to the
cursory responses discussed above.
To be clear, FOIA officers are not, by any stretch, solely (or
even primarily) to blame here.45 Not only are they negotiating vari-
ous institutional pressures with ambiguous standards, but they are
doing so with inadequate resources. Lofty rhetoric and statutory
mandates notwithstanding, Congress’s failure to allocate sufficient
resources for the administration of the FOIA is principally to
blame for the long delays in processing requests.46 The funding
that is allocated is often maldistributed, with those agencies with a
relatively small domestic political constituency, such as the U.S. Cit-
izenship and Immigration Services, receiving disproportionately lit-
tle funding despite receiving a disproportionately high percentage
of all FOIA requests.47
43 Given these pressures, for example, FOIA officers seem more likely to err on the
side of conducting a narrow search and/or disclosing only that information that
clearly does not fall within a statutory exemption. Narrow searches save time, and
even if agency officials conduct an egregiously narrow one, it is unlikely that the ade-
quacy of the search will ever be reviewed. In fact, in regards to some agencies (like
those involved in law enforcement or national security) or some records (like those
which would be clearly embarrassing to identifiable individuals), FOIA officers are
more likely to receive negative feedback for disclosing too much information than too
little.
44 See SUMMARY OF 2008 FOIA REPORTS, supra note 31 (discussing backlogs).
45 Indeed, when the FOIA works at all, it is usually their doing. See generally
Kreimer, supra note 24, at 1046–49 (discussing how “FOIA’s efficacy depends on a
law-abiding civil service”).
46 In Fiscal Year 2008, the federal government, as a whole, spent approximately
$338 million on the administration of the FOIA. See SUMMARY OF 2008 FOIA REPORTS,
supra note 31. That figure is virtually unchanged from Fiscal Year 2003. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, FOIA POST, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA
REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/
foiapost/2004foiapost22.htm (posted July 29, 2004).
47 Even though USCIS receives a majority of all FOIA requests received by DHS,
and even though it also has the largest backlog and the longest processing times, its
FOIA budget, on a per-processed-request basis, is dwarfed by nearly all other DHS
components. See SUMMARY OF 2008 FOIA REPORTS, supra note 31. Many, if not most,
FOIA requests to USCIS are on behalf of non-citizens requesting their Alien (or “A”)
Files. Non-citizens must use FOIA because the Privacy Act only applies to citizens and
legal permanent residents, see Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(2) (2000); and
discovery is generally unavailable in Immigration Court, including in removal (depor-
tation) proceedings, see supra note 3.
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In summary, the administration of the FOIA is seriously ham-
pered by broad decentralization; relatively little oversight; institu-
tional pressure to reduce backlogs; and chronic understaffing. Add
in political considerations and, at least recently, concerns (real,
contrived, or exaggerated) about releasing information related to
national security,48 and what results is a deeply flawed system.49
On the other hand, someone else might look at the same
facts—especially the relatively few FOIA requests that are adminis-
tratively appealed and/or litigated—and conclude that agencies do
a generally satisfactory job administering the FOIA. But that assess-
ment would depend on the assumption that every inadequate
agency response is administratively appealed and/or litigated, and
the available evidence is to the contrary.
One way to measure the adequacy of an agency’s response is
to compare its pre-litigation response to a FOIA request to its sup-
plemental response to that same request after the agency has been
sued. That comparison yields a sharp contrast, both in respect to
the number of records produced and the exemptions that agencies
choose to defend in court. With regards to the former, it appears
common for an agency to produce several times more records after
being sued for a FOIA violation than it did pre-litigation, even
while averring in pre-litigation response letters that it had pro-
duced all responsive records.50 The story is similar with respect to
48 See, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency and Accountability in a Time of Terror: The
Bush Administration’s Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 479 (2006);
Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism,
and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141 (2007); see also DOJ
Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 808 (“Courts often take into account an agency’s
predictive judgment with respect to potential harm, particularly in cases in which dis-
closure would compromise national security. Conversely, courts have consistently held
that ‘a requester’s opinion disputing the risk created by disclosure is not sufficient to
preclude summary judgment for the agency when the agency possessing the relevant
expertise has provided sufficiently detailed affidavits.’”); id. nn.304–05 (collecting
cases).
49 David Carr, Let the Sun Shine, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007, at C1 (“Four decades
ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson reluctantly signed the Freedom of Information Act
(F.O.I.A.) into law. . . . The law held that information gathered on our behalf—paid
for and owned by you and me, at least theoretically—should be ours for the asking.
But it hasn’t worked out that way. While the mandate for disclosure is still there, it is
overwhelmed by a Rube Goldberg apparatus that clanks and wheezes, but rarely turns
up the data.”).
50 For example, in response to a 2008 FOIA request regarding a Baltimore immi-
gration raid sent by the non-profit organization CASA de Maryland to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a DHS component, ICE provided a “final re-
sponse” that disclosed just four pages of responsive records. See Response Letter from
ICE to FOIA Request # 2009F0IA524 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.scribd.
com/doc/34495971. After CASA de Maryland filed suit, see CASA de Maryland v.
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exemptions, as it is not uncommon for agencies to decide, once in
litigation, that they cannot carry their burden vis-a`-vis certain ex-
emptions, and therefore choose not to defend them.51
Given the institutional pressures described above, perhaps this
is not a surprising phenomenon. What it suggests, however, is that
agencies use the willingness of a requester to litigate FOIA requests
as a mechanism to distinguish between requests for which a cursory
response is sufficient—either because the requester is satisfied with
the response, or, perhaps more often, because the requester does
not know the response was incomplete or cannot afford to contest
it through litigation—from those that demand full compliance
with the FOIA. The unfortunate lesson, then, is that unless the re-
quest is relatively narrow—and therefore easy to fulfill—litigation
may be necessary to vindicate the access guaranteed by the FOIA.52
III. DRAFTING SUCCESSFUL FOIA REQUESTS
With the shortcomings discussed above in mind, this Section
outlines a few strategies for crafting FOIA requests to maximize the
amount of information they will produce. This Section is primarily
aimed at getting the most information out of the FOIA without
having to resort to litigation, but most (if not all) of these strategies
will also serve well those requesters who ultimately seek judicial
review.
A. Knowing How to Ask
Of all the lessons to be drawn from the realities described in
DHS, No. 08CV3249 (D. Md. filed Dec. 3, 2008), ICE produced nearly 1700 pages of
records and 17 video recordings, including many records that shed significant light
on possible government misconduct related to the raid. See N.C. Aizenman, Conflicting
Accounts of an ICE Raid in Maryland, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1; All Things Consid-
ered: Feds Allegedly Profiled Hispanic Day Laborers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2009),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100027476. Yale
Law School Professor Michael Wishnie, who has taught three law school clinics that
represent clients in submitting and litigating FOIA requests, confirms that, in his ex-
perience, this type of pre- and post-litigation disparity in FOIA responses is common-
place. Telephone Interview with Michael Wishnie, Clinical Prof. of Law, Yale Law
School (July 19, 2010). Professor Wishnie also confirms that agencies, which fre-
quently rely on paralegals to prepare FOIA responses, routinely take a “second look”
at claimed exemptions with their legal counsel once litigation has begun, and on the
advice of counsel often decide to disclose some records the agency had previously
claimed fell under one or more exemptions. Id.
51 Telephone Interview with Michael Wishnie, Clinical Prof. of Law, Yale Law
School (July 19, 2010).
52 One might hope that the newly-created Office of Government Information Ser-
vices will at least lessen the necessity of litigation—a possibility touched upon at the
end of this Article. See infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
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Section II, perhaps the most important is that agencies simply do
not have the resources to thoroughly process most requests. Thus,
even though agencies are required to search everywhere that is rea-
sonably likely to have the records requested,53 that seldom hap-
pens. This is especially true with respect to ambiguous and/or
broadly-written requests; what counts as a “reasonable search” in
response to an ambiguous request is naturally open to interpreta-
tion. Therefore, although it may make intuitive sense to give the
agency broad discretion in processing a FOIA request—after all, it
should know best what records it has and how to search its record-
keeping systems—the institutional pressures previously discussed
suggest that agency discretion will be utilized to minimize the
agency’s burden, which will usually mean a less-thorough response.
For this reason, minimizing agency discretion is an important con-
sideration when crafting FOIA requests.54
In general, minimizing agency discretion means writing re-
quests as specifically and precisely as possible, such that as little as
possible is left to interpretation.55 There are two primary ways to do
this. First, requests can be written to identify (by name, if possible)
the exact records sought. For example, instead of asking Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for “all manuals of policies
and procedures related to immigration detention,” a request ask-
ing for the specific manuals known to exist will get better results.
But it is not likely that the requester will know all of the manuals in
existence (a general problem discussed at length below). There-
fore, if the goal is to get all of the manuals, the best route is proba-
bly to request “all manuals of policies and procedures, including
but not limited to [the names of the manuals of which the re-
quester is aware].” Although it is possible that the FOIA officer will
simply send the specifically-named manuals, that would be the ab-
solute minimum that the requester would expect to receive; and if
that is the entirety of what ICE sends in response, the requester has
increased the odds of a successful appeal.
53 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54 One exception to the general rule that minimizing an agency’s discretion will
be detrimental to the interests of the requester is when copying and/or search fees
are an issue; in that situation, a knowledgeable FOIA officer can reduce the expense
to the requester without significantly sacrificing the information sought. That said,
the 2007 amendments to the FOIA have diminished the likelihood that fees will be a
major concern for requesters. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
55 See Kreimer, supra note 24, at 1027 n.59 (“A precise inquiry is more likely to be
correctly processed by harried civil servants at ground level; it is less subject to evasion
by hostile ones, and it presents the requester with smaller costs of sorting signal from
noise in the material provided.”).
2010] MAXIMIZING INFORMATION’S FREEDOM 401
Another way of trying to minimize agency discretion in
processing FOIA requests is to describe the search requested. Since
a FOIA request need only “reasonably describe” the information
sought, there is no reason why requesters cannot write FOIA re-
quests in terms of the searches that they would like performed,
rather than to simply describe the information or particular
records sought.56 This can be a particularly useful way to write a
request if, for example, requesters know that they want all records
in a particular database that mention a certain topic, but do not
know the names of specific records or what format they will take.
To write a request this way, keep in mind that to fulfill a request,
FOIA officers generally do one or more of the following: conduct
an electronic search of databases (and other digitized files); manu-
ally examine physical files; and request that individuals in other
locations do one or both of the same.57 Therefore, if requesters
know that they would want a particular database, physical file loca-
tion, or office searched, they are well advised to put that in the
request.58 For example, using the same hypothetical as above, if a
requester does not know the names of any of the government’s
immigration enforcement manuals, but does know where they can
be accessed, the request can be written to ask for “all manuals of
policies and procedures, including but not limited to those con-
tained in [name of database or those on file in a particular office].”
In regards to electronic searches, requesters can go a step fur-
ther and specify particular keywords to use.59 If a FOIA request
does not specify particular keywords, then whoever conducts the
search will try to discern appropriate keywords from the text of the
request letter.60 Since requesters are often (though not always) in a
better position to know what keywords are likely to produce rele-
vant records, it is a good idea to include them in the request letter.
56 Assuming, as with any other request, that it is not “unreasonably burdensome.”
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
57 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(D).
58 Thus, one could request “all records related to X contained in the following
databases: . . . .”
59 See, e.g., Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
60 With the advent of electronic databases, recent cases have emphasized the need
for agencies to specify “the search terms and the type of search terms” used in con-
ducting search for records responsive to a FOIA request. Valencia-Lucena v. U.S.
Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (search affidavit inadequate where it did not “identify[ ] the terms
searched or explain[ ] how the search was conducted”); Dinisio v. FBI, 445 F. Supp.
2d 305, 312 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (agency affidavit should set forth “the search terms and
the type of search performed”).
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Keep in mind, however, that agencies can decline to use particular
terms if they would return an unreasonably large amount of non-
responsive information.61
In addition to increasing the chances of a satisfactory re-
sponse, a benefit of drafting a request in terms of the particular
search to be performed is that when requesters receive a response,
they should have more information about the search conducted.
No matter how a request is written, though, there is generally a
trade-off between the breadth of the request and the time it takes
the agency to fulfill it. If just one piece of information in a broadly-
worded request is particularly time-sensitive, it may be faster to re-
quest that information separately from the rest.62
This discussion of requesting particular records or asking that
certain databases be searched presents an epistemological prob-
lem, for it seems to require, a priori, a certain amount of knowledge
about the records sought or the recordkeeping systems to be
searched. The next Section discusses how to acquire that
knowledge.
B. Finding Information on Information
In theory, it should be relatively easy to find out the primary
sources of agency records. Since 1996, the FOIA has required each
agency to “prepare and make publicly available upon request, ref-
erence material or a guide for requesting records or information
from the agency . . . including an index of all major information
systems of the agency [and] a description of major information
and record locator systems maintained by the agency.”63 But like
much about the FOIA, compliance with this requirement varies
61 See DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 77 n.205, 78 n.206 (collecting cases).
62 It may also qualify for expedited processing, which essentially puts it at the front
of the line of requests to be processed. See supra note 14. But keep in mind that the
FOIA permits agencies to promulgate regulations that provide for the aggregation of
“clearly related” requests submitted “by the same requester, or by a group of reques-
ters acting in concert, if the agency reasonably believes that such requests actually
constitute a single request.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(B)(iv) (2006).
63 Electronic Freedom of Information Act (“E-FOIA”) Amendments of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-231, § 11, 110 Stat. 3048, 3054 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(g) (2006)). The
House Report accompanying the E-FOIA explained that: “The guide is intended to be
a short and simple explanation for the public of what the Freedom of Information Act
is designed to do, and how a member of the public can use it to access government
records. Each agency should explain in clear and simple language, the types of
records that can be obtained from the agency through FOIA requests . . . .” H.R. REP.
NO. 104-795, at 29–30 (1996). The Senate Report is consistent, and also makes clear
that the compilation of this index is required and that it should be posted online. See
S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 11–12 (1996).
2010] MAXIMIZING INFORMATION’S FREEDOM 403
widely. The Department of Justice, for example, appears to be in
substantial compliance, as it maintains a list of major information
systems, listed alphabetically64 and by component.65 This list is use-
ful, but it could be much more so (both to requesters and to the
agency), because few of the information systems’ descriptions have
any data on how they are searched or the kinds of records they
produce.66 But at least the DOJ posts something; many agencies have
done nothing to comply with this statutory mandate.67 Moreover,
since the focus of most agencies and Congress is on reducing
agency backlogs, creating a list of major information systems is not
high on the list of problems to be fixed.68
So once more, FOIA requesters have to navigate around the
statute’s absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. One an-
swer is to leverage the multitude of other readily available informa-
tion sources that, woven together, form what Professor Seth
Kreimer has described as the “ecology” of governmental trans-
parency.69 By researching these other sources, requesters can gain
a better understanding of what information exists—and therefore
what information is reachable with the FOIA—which leads to bet-
ter-tailored requests and more successful FOIA litigation. I will fo-
64 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alphabetical Listing of Justice Department — Major Infor-
mation Systems, http://www.justice.gov/oip/misalphabetical.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2010).
65 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Major Information Systems of the Department of Justice
Arranged on a Component-by-Component Basis, http://www.justice.gov/oip/mis-
component.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
66 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys Office, Citizen Complaint Files,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/citizencomplaint.html (last visited Nov.
8, 2010) (instructing requesters to provide “the general subject matter of the docu-
ment requested or its file number”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Security Div., Office
of Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Records System, http:/
/www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/mis/ficrs.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (instructing that
requests should “describe the records to which you seek access”); U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Civil Rights Div., Case Management System, http://www.justice.gov/crt/foia/ma-
jor.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2010) (providing no information on how it is searched).
67 In a 2007 study of 149 agency websites, the National Security Archive found,
inter alia, that “only 36 percent of agency sites include an identifiable list of major
information systems.” NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, supra note 27, at 13. Of the lists that were
available at that time, “many . . . [were] incomprehensible or unhelpful.” Id. at 1.
68 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: DHS
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENHANCE ITS PROGRAM, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE
EFFICIENCY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS 3–4 (Mar. 2009) (suggesting that DHS implement
five practices on an agency-wide scale, most of them related to processing requests
more quickly and more cheaply), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09260.
pdf.
69 See generally Kreimer, supra note 24 (defending the FOIA from its critics by dem-
onstrating how it must be assessed within a broader “ecology of transparency”).
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cus here on three sources of information that exist with regard to
virtually all agencies.
i. FOIA Disclosures & FOIA Logs
The first source is FOIA disclosures. Many agencies have train-
ing and reference materials describing agency databases and ex-
plaining how each is searched;70 insofar as they are not readily
available to the public, these records are themselves subject to the
FOIA. Similarly, FOIA logs—a list of all requests, arranged chrono-
logically, that an agency received during a given fiscal year—are
valuable sources of information as well. The logs generally contain
information about the requester; a description of the request; the
date the request was received and processed; a unique tracking
number; and the final disposition of the request (i.e., granted in
full, denied, etc.). This information seems mundane, but is actually
quite valuable. Perhaps most usefully, FOIA logs demonstrate the
sheer breadth of records that are available and how requests are
commonly framed. The requesters’ identities and the subjects of
their requests can also be illuminating.71 The logs also permit re-
questers to “piggyback” on prior requests by asking the agency to
provide the same records it disclosed in response to a specific prior
request made by someone else.72 By definition, the agency has al-
ready compiled and reviewed all of the records at issue, and so
disclosing them again takes little additional effort.73 Partially for
70 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECTION 287(G) TRAINING
PROGRAM PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK, INTRODUCTION TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION (Nov.
2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21968668.
71 For example, during the 2008 presidential campaign, the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) requested from ICE all records of communication involving Re-
publican presidential candidates John McCain and Fred Thompson. See Immigration
and Customs Enforcement FOIA Log [hereinafter ICE FOIA Log] 203, 491, 625, 904
(Sept. 2007 through Nov. 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/icefoia-
logs/foialogseptember2007tonovember2008.pdf. Although the Republican National
Committee (RNC) is not listed in the ICE FOIA Log as a requester, an individual did
request copies of all correspondence to and from Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
in March 2008. See id. at 537, 557. A simple Google search of that requester’s name
reveals that he worked as a research analyst for the RNC when the requests were sent.
72 A piggyback request might say something like, “please provide all records dis-
closed in response to FOIA case number 504, which you received by your agency on
November 17, 2008.” For more on sending this type of request, see Freedom of Infor-
mation Center, FOIA the FOIAs, http://www.nfoic.org/foia-the-foias (last visited Nov.
8, 2010).
73 The 1996 amendments to the FOIA created the requirement that agencies
maintain logs of requests, see Electronic Freedom of Information Act (“E-FOIA”)
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 4, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2006)), primarily because of its time-saving benefits. See S. REP.
NO. 104-272, at 13 (1996) (“Since requests for records provided in response to prior
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this reason—and also because they are frequent subjects of FOIA
requests—a few agencies have begun posting their FOIA logs on-
line,74 and some departments have instructed all component agen-
cies to do so.75 At least one nongovernmental website maintains a
collection of FOIA logs from a variety of departments and
agencies.76
ii. Systems of Records Notices (SORNs)
Under the Privacy Act77 every federal agency78 that maintains a
recordkeeping system79 that is searchable by an individual’s name
or unique identifying number (like Social Security or alien num-
ber) must publish a notice in the Federal Register for each system
of records, describing, inter alia, the types of records it has, how
they are used, how long they are kept, and how to gain access to
them.80 These notices—required whenever a system is created or
revised81—are called “System of Records Notices,” also commonly
referred to as “SORNs” or “Privacy Act Issuances.” Pursuant to the
Privacy Act, every two years the Office of the Federal Register com-
piles and publishes all SORNs in effect.82 The most recent Compi-
lation is posted on the Office of the Federal Register’s website and
is browsable by agency.83 To be sure, a large number of agency
requests are more readily identified by the agency without the need for new searches,
this list [FOIA logs] may assist agencies in complying with the FOIA time limits. This
should also reduce costs to agencies in preparing responses. This does not, however,
relieve agencies of their obligations to conduct an adequate search for, or justify with-
holding of, responsive records as required by the FOIA.”).
74 See, e.g., ICE FOIA Log, supra note 71.
75 See, e.g., Memo from Mary Ellen Callahan, DHS Chief FOIA Officer and Chief
Privacy Officer, Regarding Proactive Disclosure and Departmental Compliance with
Subsection (a)(2) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Aug. 26, 2009) at 2,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/foia_proactive_disclosure.pdf
(“As Chief FOIA Officer, I direct the Department and its components to include the
following categories of records on their agency websites and link them to their respec-
tive electronic reading rooms: . . . . 5. FOIA logs.”).
76 See, e.g., GovernmentAttic.org (click on “FOIA LOGS” at top of page) (last vis-
ited Nov. 8, 2010).
77 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
78 The Privacy Act defines “agency” the same as the FOIA does. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(1); see also supra note 11 (discussing the FOIA definition of “agency”).
79 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (defining “record”); § 552a(a)(5) (defining “system of
records”).
80 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4). See generally Office of the Federal Register, Privacy Act
Issuances, http://federalregister.gov/Privacy/about.aspx (last visited July 17, 2010).
81 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4).
82 Id. § 552a(f).
83 Office of the Federal Register, Privacy Act Issuances: Browse the 2007 Compila-
tion, http://federalregister.gov/Privacy/AGENCIES.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
Previous editions of the Compilation are available (and searchable) on the Govern-
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recordkeeping systems will not have a SORN, such as those that are
organized by date or event, or that do not have records on citizens
or lawful permanent residents.84 But depending on the type of in-
formation sought, SORNs can be useful in ascertaining what re-
cordkeeping systems exist, the kind of records each system
contains, and how each is searched.
iii. FOIA Litigation Materials
By far the most useful resources for understanding agencies’
recordkeeping systems are the documents agencies file once they
are forced to defend FOIA decisions in court. FOIA lawsuits are
nearly always resolved on motions for summary judgment,85 on
which the agency must carry two burdens: first, the agency must
prove that any claimed exemptions were properly applied;86 and
second, that it “conduct[ed] a search reasonably calculated to un-
cover all relevant documents.”87 In order to carry its twin burdens,
agencies typically submit one or more “relatively detailed and non-
conclusory”88 affidavits from the government official(s) personally
involved in applying the exemption(s) and conducting the
search(es).89 The affidavits’ explanations for why certain exemp-
ment Printing Office’s site at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/privacyact/index.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010).
84 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (defining “individual” as a
“citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
85 See DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 803 (“Summary judgment is the proce-
dural vehicle by which nearly all FOIA cases are resolved . . . .”); see also LITIGATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 365–68 (discussing
considerations to take into account when considering the timing of filing a motion
for summary judgment). For a critique of deciding virtually all FOIA cases on motions
for summary judgment, see Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA Ap-
peals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (2006).
86 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 755 (1989) (holding that the burden of proving that withholding the records is
not improper falls on the agency). If the reviewing court “find[s] either that the ratio-
nale of the particular exemption did not apply to these documents, or that the agency
had failed to demonstrate the prerequisites to proper invocation of the exemption,” it
may order the agency to release the records. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
87 Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal citations
omitted); see also Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(“[T]he agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the
requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the
information requested.” (internal citations omitted)).
88 SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal cita-
tion omitted); see also Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 680
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that conclusory and generalized allegations are unaccept-
able as means of sustaining agency burden).
89 See Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In order to
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tions were applied have relatively little value to non-parties, as they
are usually too case-specific to be of general application. In con-
trast, the affidavits’ descriptions of the searches performed for
records responsive to the FOIA requests are a goldmine for future
requesters, even those not involved in the litigation.
In regards to the search, agency affidavits in support of sum-
mary judgment must describe the electronic recordkeeping sys-
tems and physical file locations searched, as well as how they were
searched.90 If electronic records (such as databases and email)
were searched, agency affidavits are required to explain how the
records are organized (i.e., by name, topic, date, etc.) and what
search terms or keywords were used to search for responsive
records.91 If the agency chose not to search in certain locations
(such as field offices) or databases, it must explain why those addi-
tional searches were either impractical or unlikely to produce re-
sponsive records.92 In sum, agency affidavits in support of summary
judgment must include detailed information about the record-
keeping systems to which the agency has access; how those systems
are searched; and what kinds of records they contain.
In litigation, this information is necessary to permit the court
to evaluate the reasonableness of an agency’s search,93 but it is also
prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending agency has
the burden of showing that its search was adequate and that any withheld documents
fall within an exemption to the FOIA.”).
90 See Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(“[A]gency affidavits that ‘do not denote which files were searched or by whom, do
not reflect any systematic approach to document location, and do not provide infor-
mation specific enough to enable [the requester] to challenge the procedure utilized’
are insufficient.” (internal citations omitted)).
91 See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (search affidavit inade-
quate where it did not “identify[ ] the terms searched or explain[ ] how the search
was conducted”); Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68 (“A reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth
the search terms and the type of search performed . . . is necessary to afford a FOIA
requester an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the search and to allow the
district court to determine if the search was adequate in order to grant summary
judgment.”).
92 See Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing
how agency affidavits should “identify the searched files and describe at least gener-
ally the structure of the agency’s file system which makes further search difficult.”),
aff’d, 484 U.S. 9 (1987); see, e.g., Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[A]n agency ‘cannot limit its search to only one record system if
there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested.’” (quoting
Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68)).
93 If an affidavit is inadequate, courts routinely order the agency to submit a more-
detailed supplemental affidavit. See, e.g., Penny v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 662 F. Supp.2d
53, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2009); Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. USDA, 539 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228
(D.D.C. 2008); Santos v. DEA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2004). See also Weis-
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of substantial value to prospective FOIA requesters. With the de-
scriptions contained in these affidavits, requesters can draft far
more precise FOIA requests, which can decrease processing time
and increase the odds of receiving the information sought. Moreo-
ver, when agencies do respond to the requests, the requesters will
be in a much better position to evaluate those responses. Finally,
requesters who end up litigating their own requests can use agency
affidavits from other cases to demonstrate that the agency’s search
in the instant case was not adequate.94 Without this type of infor-
mation, FOIA plaintiffs are left to speculate that more information
should have been produced or that some other source of records
must exist, which is insufficient to create an issue of material fact
about the reasonableness of the agency’s search.95
Unfortunately, agency affidavits are not easily accessible. In
fact, currently there is only one place where these affidavits are
available—PACER, the federal judiciary’s system for public, elec-
tronic access to docket sheets and case filings.96 Although PACER
is far from user-friendly or search-optimized,97 it has greatly en-
berg v. Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the require-
ments for an affidavit describing an agency’s search for responsive records).
94 Imagine, for example, that an agency affidavit from a prior case stated that
database X contains records of type Y. If the plaintiff in the subsequent case requested
records of type Y, but the agency did not search database X, the plaintiff can use the
agency affidavit from the prior case to demonstrate that the agency’s search was not
adequate, as it failed to search a database it has previously identified as reasonably
likely to contain the type of record requested.
95 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[M]ere
speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the find-
ing that the agency conducted a reasonable search.” (internal citation omitted));
Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s speculation as
to the existence of additional records, absent support for his allegations of agency bad
faith, does not render the searches inadequate.”); Bay Area Lawyers Alliance for Nu-
clear Arms Control v. Dep’t of State, 818 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Plain-
tiff’s incredulity at the fact that no responsive documents were uncovered . . . does not
constitute evidence of unreasonableness or bad faith.”).
96 PACER stands for “Public Access to Court Electronic Records.” PACER, which
can be accessed at http://www.pacer.gov, is run by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, and was authorized in 1989 through the creation of the “Judici-
ary Automation Fund.” See Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 404, 103 Stat. 988, 1013–15 (1989)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 612 (2006)). The Fund was renamed the “Judiciary Informa-
tion Technology Fund” in 1996. See Pub L. No. 104-106, § 5602(b)(2), 110 Stat. 186,
700 (1996). For critiques of PACER’s current limitations, see Ian Gallacher, Cite Un-
seen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools Can Cure Our Strange Devotion to
Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of Open and Equal Access to the Law, 70 AL-
BANY L. REV. 491, 514–21 (2007), and Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94
IOWA L. REV. 481 (2009).
97 See LoPucki, supra note 96, at 485–89 (suggesting technological reforms to
PACER to achieve greater transparency).
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hanced court access and opened new avenues for legal research.98
Most relevant for present purposes, it permits individuals to
download (for a fee) filings from most civil cases initiated in the
last several years, including agency affidavits filed in support of
summary judgment motions in FOIA cases.99
Unfortunately, unlike with FOIA logs,100 as of this writing, this
author could not locate any organization or individual that collects
and posts these affidavits online,101 leaving PACER, with all its
shortcomings, as the only option currently available.102
98 See generally, e.g., Peter W. Martin, The New “Public Courts”: Online Access to Court
Records – From Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855 (2008);
Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and
Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 160
(2006). A recent study suggests that only a fraction of opinions found on PACER are
included in the Lexis and Westlaw databases. Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The
Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107,
108–9 (2007) (finding that only 41% of 607 cases terminated by a grant of summary
judgment were available on Lexis or Westlaw); see also Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law:
Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973 (2008).
99 Finding these cases on PACER can be done in a couple of different ways. First,
PACER permits users to search the civil cases in its “U.S. Party Case Index” by the
“nature of suit.” See Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pacer.gov/psc/hfaq.html
(follow “CM/ECF” tab and search under “General,” “Case Related,” and “Access Re-
lated” sub-tabs) (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). Thus, one could search for all district
court cases with the FOIA’s “nature of suit” code filed within a given timeframe and
against a particular defendant agency. From there, however, each returned case
would have to be examined manually to determine its relevancy, which can be both
tedious and expensive. A list of these codes is available at http://www.pacer.gov/doc-
uments/natsuit.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). The code for FOIA suits is 895. Id. at
3. When searching by defendants, keep in mind that the proper defendant in a FOIA
action against an agency that is a component of an Executive-branch department is
the department itself. Thus, if a FOIA suit is about a violation by Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP), a component agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the named defendant should be DHS. See LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOV-
ERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4, at 359. The other option for finding FOIA cases is to
consult the annual list published by the Department of Justice of all FOIA cases in
which a decision was rendered in the preceding year. That list contains the court,
docket number, and disposition of each case. Unlike the PACER search described
above, this list only contains cases in which a decision was rendered. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, LIST OF FOIA CASES IN WHICH A DECISION WAS RENDERED IN 2008, supra note
42. The DOJ also publishes a monthly summary of FOIA decisions in its newsletter,
FOIA POST, which is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/mainpage.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010). After weeding out the cases that were dismissed without a
judgment being entered (which are noted in the list), the remaining cases would be
likely candidates to have agency affidavits accessible through PACER.
100 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101 An exception is INA287.org, which has a collection of approximately 25 affida-
vits from FOIA cases, most from DHS component agencies. See FOIA, INA287.org,
http://ina287.org/foia (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
102 One might try requesting the affidavits through FOIA, though it is not clear
what effect the fact that the affidavits are already in the public domain would have (if
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C. Litigating FOIA Requests: Discovery
There is not sufficient time or space in this Article for a thor-
ough treatment of litigating FOIA requests,103 and so this subsec-
tion is confined to one often-overlooked item directly related to
the previous discussion: obtaining discovery in FOIA litigation. As
already discussed, most FOIA cases are resolved on summary judg-
ment motions, in which the defendant agency submits affidavits to
substantiate its claims that all exemptions have been properly ap-
plied and that it has conducted a reasonable search. Each FOIA
exemption has its own standard that has been developed through
legislation and case law.104 The requester is at a disadvantage when
resisting summary judgment as to the application of the statutory
exemptions, as the applicability of exemptions generally are depen-
dent on the content of the requested records themselves—content
that, by definition, has been denied to the requester. Given the
informational asymmetry between the requester and the defendant
agency, often the most a requester can do is to insist that the
agency affidavit in support of summary judgment contain all the
factual averments necessary to meet each exemption’s test. That
said, even when agencies are capable of legally justifying an exemp-
tion, they sometimes fail to do so in the affidavits they submit.105 If
any). For example, in an unpublished opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district
court decision dismissing a FOIA complaint because the request asked “only [for]
material that would be available in the public domain”—in this case, the Federal Reg-
ister—which the court said was not covered by the FOIA. Perales v. DEA, 21 F. App’x
473, 475 (7th Cir 2001). Cf. Prows v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice No. 87CV1657-LFO, 1989
WL 39288, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1989) (denying a fee waiver for the reproduction of
564 pages of court records because “the release of records already in a court’s public
files . . . would not ‘contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations
or activities of the government.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)).
103 The gold standard on this topic is LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOV-
ERNMENT LAWS, supra note 4, which is published approximately every two years by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”). For a more Government-friendly
view of what the FOIA requires, see DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8.
104 See generally LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS, supra note
4, at 49–252 (discussing exemptions); DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 141–669
(same).
105 For example, in Elliott v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 06-240 (JDB), 2007
WL 1302588, at *5 (D.D.C. May 2, 2007), the agency sought to withhold blueprints
under the so-called “high 2” exemption 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), which requires show-
ing that the withheld information is both “predominantly internal” to the agency and
that disclosing it would risk circumvention of agency statutes or regulations. See Schil-
ler v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the “high 2” exemp-
tion). In Elliott, the court denied summary judgment because, inter alia, the
declarations did not say which agency statutes or regulations would be at risk of cir-
cumvention if the blueprints were released. See 2007 WL 1302588, at *5. As is often
the case, though, the agency was permitted later to renew its motion for summary
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agency affidavits omit the facts necessary to meet one or more ele-
ments of an exemption’s test, the judge has the discretion to order
supplemental affidavits, an in camera review, or that the agency sim-
ply disclose the information.106
As previously mentioned, requesters can use affidavits from
other cases to create a disputed issue of material fact with regard to
the adequacy of the agency’s search. Moreover, since the suffi-
ciency of an agency’s search is an issue of fact, it is possible to ob-
tain discovery on the relevant factual issues, such as the agencies’
recordkeeping systems and the specific searches that were con-
ducted in response to the request being litigated.107 Depending on
the subject of the FOIA request, discovery may be appropriate on
what records ought to exist and where they ought to be stored,108
or even why the defendant agency has taken so long to process the
request.109 Requesters should be aware, however, that courts are
reluctant to permit FOIA plaintiffs to conduct discovery unless and
until the agency affidavits have proven inadequate or there is a spe-
cific showing of bad faith on the part of the agency.110 Nonetheless,
judgment; in this case, the agency submitted three additional declarations, which
were far more detailed and cited to specific statutes, regulations, and policies. See Mot.
for Summ. J. for Def., Elliott v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., No. 06CV240 (JDB) (D.D.C. Aug.
16, 2007) (docket entry no. 37). The court cited them extensively in granting the
summary judgment to the agency. See Elliott v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 518 F. Supp. 2d
217, 221 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that the blueprints were properly withheld under
the “high 2” exemption).
106 See, e.g., Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 1999);
107 See, e.g., Local 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1177,
1179 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Discovery in a FOIA action is permitted in order to determine
whether a complete disclosure of documents has been made and whether those with-
held are exempt from disclosure.”); Giza v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 628 F.2d
748, 751 (1st Cir. 1980) (“To the extent that discovery is allowed in an FOIA action, it
is directed at determining whether complete disclosure has been made, e. g., whether
a thorough search for documents has taken place, whether withheld items are exempt
from disclosure.”); El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F. Supp. 2d 285,
321–22 (D. Conn. 2008) (permitting plaintiff to depose employees of five different
DHS component agencies regarding the sufficiency of their searches after the agency
affidavits were inadequate); Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D.D.C. 1980)
(“It is beyond question that discovery is appropriate” in a FOIA case if the govern-
ment’s dispositive motion leaves a factual issue concerning the adequacy of the
agency’s search); DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 763 n.171 (collecting cases).
108 See, e.g., El Badrawi, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (permitting plaintiff to depose the
agency employee “most knowledgeable about the whereabouts of the missing . . .
file.”).
109 See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, No. 05CV2078, 2006 WL 1518964, at *3–4, 6 (D.D.C. June 1, 2006).
110 See, e.g., Carney v. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Affidavits
submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith, . . . [and] accord-
ingly, discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it claims for with-
holding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submissions are adequate on
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permitting discovery is well within the district court’s discretion,111
and so FOIA plaintiffs should not hesitate to seek discovery from
the agency—which, after all, “has an effective monopoly on the rel-
evant information.”112 Absent evidence of an agency’s bad faith,113
the best route for a FOIA plaintiff to secure discovery on the ade-
quacy of an agency’s search is probably by: (1) drafting relatively
precise requests that name specific documents requested and/or
locations to search;114 and (2) learning enough about the agency’s
recordkeeping systems and what they should contain115 such that
the plaintiff can demonstrate that it was unreasonable for the
agency to refuse to search a specific location, or that the failure to
produce a particular record is indication that the agency did not
conduct a reasonable search.116
IV. INFORMATION FEDERALISM
No discussion of how to leverage other sources of information
to maximize the efficacy of the FOIA would be complete without at
least a few words about the 51 other freedom of information
(“FOI”) laws in effect in the United States: FOIA’s state-law and
their face.”); DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 810 (“Discovery is the exception,
not the rule, in FOIA cases); id. at n.311 (providing examples of cases that demon-
strate the reluctance of courts to allow discovery in FOIA cases); see also Local Civil
Rule 26.2 of the District Court for the District of Columbia (exempting FOIA cases
from discovery requirements, subject to the court ordering otherwise); but cf. Halpern
v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he good faith presumption that attaches
to agency affidavits only applies when accompanied by reasonably detailed explana-
tions of why material was withheld.”). For more on the presumption of good-faith
presumption afforded agency affidavits, see DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra note 8, at 762
n.170 (collecting cases).
111 See, e.g., Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473 F.3d 312, 317
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir.
1991) and Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993)).
112 Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explaining, in a FOIA case,
that “[i]nterrogatories and depositions are especially important in a case where one
party has an effective monopoly on the relevant information.”).
113 See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2001) (“[A] mere assertion of bad faith is not sufficient to overcome a motion for
summary judgment.”).
114 See supra Section III.A.
115 See supra Section III.B.
116 As the D.C. Circuit put it in an oft-cited case, “[I]f, in the face of well-defined
requests and positive indications of overlooked materials, an agency can so easily
avoid adversary scrutiny of its search techniques, the [Freedom of Information] Act
will inevitably become nugatory.” Church of Scientology of Washington v. NSA, 610
F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Spannaus v. CIA, 841 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C.
1993) (“If the requester produces countervailing evidence placing the sufficiency of
the identification or retrieval procedures genuinely in issue, summary judgment is
inappropriate.”).
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District of Columbia counterparts.117 Although state FOI laws go by
a multitude of names—the Public Records Law,118 the Open
Records Act,119 the Sunshine Law,120 and many more121—in most
respects they are quite similar to the federal FOIA. In addition to a
shared purpose of providing access to governmental information,
many state FOI laws were explicitly modeled on the federal FOIA
and therefore track its provisions quite closely.122 Virtually all share
at least the broad contours of the federal FOIA, in that records are
presumed to be open to the public; subject to specific exemptions
that are to be narrowly construed; with a private right of action to
contest denials in state court; where, in the absence of applicable
precedent from their own FOI laws, state judges will frequently
look to how federal courts have construed analogous provisions of
the federal FOIA.123
117 Hereinafter, all references to “states” or “state FOI laws” are meant to encom-
pass the District of Columbia and its Freedom of Information Act, D.C. CODE §§ 2-531
through 2-540 (2006). Also worth noting, though well beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, is that several municipalities have enacted sunshine ordinances governing access
to information held by municipal entities. See, e.g., Sunshine Ordinances, FIRST AMEND-
MENT COALITION, http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/category/resources/sun-
shine-ordinances (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (discussing seven sunshine ordinances in
California); Kate Gardiner, Sunshine Ordinance Passes, CHICAGOIST (Apr. 22, 2009) (dis-
cussing passage of Chicago’s Sunshine Ordinance).
118 Arizona Public Records Law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 39-121 to 39-126 (2009).
119 Kentucky Open Records Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.870–61.884 (2009).
120 Missouri Sunshine Law, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 610.010–610.225 (2009). Missouri
also has a Public Records Law (Public and Business Records, MO. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.180–109.190 (2009)), but it is more limited than the Sunshine Law and, gener-
ally speaking, whatever can be obtained through the Public Records Law can also be
obtained through the Sunshine Law. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Lipman & Evan Z. Reid,
Open Gov’t Guide: Missouri, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2006), avail-
able at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php?op=browse&state=MO.
121 See, e.g., Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-200 to
1-259 (2009); Hawaii Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA), HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 92F-1 to 92F-19 (2008); Maryland Public Information Act, MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV’T §§ 10-611 to 10-630 (2009); Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act, R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 38-2-1 to 38-2-15 (2008).
122 However, a few states’ FOI laws actually predate the federal FOIA, some by a
considerable margin. For example, the precursor to Arizona’s current Public Records
Law was enacted in 1901, when Arizona was still a territory. See Daniel C. Barr & Amy
Oliver, Open Gov’t Guide: Arizona, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
(2006), available at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php?op=browse&state=AZ (fol-
low “foreword” hyperlink).
123 See, e.g., Times Mirror Co. v. Super. Ct., 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991) (“The
legislative history and judicial construction of the FOIA [ ] serve to illuminate the
interpretation of its California counterpart.” (citation and quotation marks omitted));
Roulette v. Dep’t of Central Mgmt. Serv., 490 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (not-
ing that the legislative history indicates that “case law construing the Federal statute
should be used in Illinois to interpret our own FOIA.”); Police Patrol Sec. Sys. v.
Prince George’s Cnty., 838 A.2d 1191, 1203 n.8 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he historical devel-
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Despite generally similar goals and heritage, however, there
are some significant differences between the federal FOIA and its
state-law analogues (as well, of course, amongst the various state
laws)—differences that can be leveraged to amplify the utility of
each. A comprehensive treatment of state FOI laws is far beyond
the scope of this Article,124 but three of the most significant differ-
ences between the FOIA and state FOI laws merit discussion.
A. State FOI Enforcement
As with the federal FOIA, state FOI laws frequently fail to de-
liver on what they promise. Like the FOIA, most are chronically
under-enforced,125 and many states’ statutes provide relatively mild
sanctions for noncompliance that are simply inadequate to deter
violations.126 A related problem, seemingly more prevalent at the
sub-federal level, is widespread ignorance on the part of govern-
ment officials as to what the state FOI law requires. Most state and
local agencies receive so few requests that they are unlikely to have
even a single employee that has been fully trained on FOI.127 This
opment of portions of the MPIA parallel those of its federal counterpart. Under these
circumstances, the interpretation of the FOIA by federal courts is persuasive.”)
124 See generally Open Gov’t Guide, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
(2006), available at http://rcfp.org/ogg/index.php. In addition to state-by-state FOI
guides, the online version permits easy comparisons of state FOI laws on a number of
features, such as time frames for responses, fees, and enforcement mechanisms. Id.
The National Freedom of Information Coalition also has state-by-state information on
its website. See State FOI Laws, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL., http://www.nfoic.org/
state-foi-laws (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, 2 FEDERAL INFORMA-
TION DISCLOSURE Ch. 27 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing state FOI laws); Sunshine Review –
United States, http://sunshinereview.org (same); WikiFOIA, http://wikifoia.pb
works.com (same).
125 See Robert Tanner, On Sunshine Laws, Governments Talk Loudly but Stick Is Very
Rarely Used, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 11, 2007 (“Though laws in every state say government
records and meetings must be open to all, reality often falls far short: Laws are sporad-
ically enforced, penalties for failure to comply are mild and violators almost always
walk away with nothing more than a reprimand, an Associated Press survey of all 50
states has found.”), available at http://www.ap.org/FOI/foi_031107a.html.
126 A 2007 study by the Better Government Association (“BGA”) and the National
Freedom of Information Coalition (“NFOIC”) graded the 50 states’ FOI statutes on
five criteria related to responsiveness (response times; appeals process; expedited re-
view; availability of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party; and the availability
and severity of possible sanctions against recalcitrant agencies). Thirty-eight states re-
ceived an “F,” four received a “D”; six a “C”; and two states (Nebraska and New Jersey)
received the highest grade given, a “B.” See BGA & NFOIC, States Failing FOI Respon-
siveness, BGA & NFOIC (2007), available at http://www.nfoic.org/bga. See also Results
and Criteria of BGA/NFOIC Survey, BGA & NFOIC (2007), available at http://www.
nfoic.org/uploads/results1.pdf (showing state-by-state results).
127 See, e.g., Records Granted Only Half the Time, OPEN REC. REPORT: SPECIAL EDITION
(Ohio Coal. for Open Gov’t, Columbus, OH), Spring/Summer 2004, available at
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lack of familiarity essentially requires the requester to educate pub-
lic officials as to what the law requires of them.
FOI requests to state and local agencies can also involve deli-
cate political considerations that are generally absent in the federal
FOIA process. At the federal level, the number of FOIA requests
agencies receive and the typical distance between the requester
and the agency provide requesters a measure of anonymity. Moreo-
ver, federal FOIA officers may be completely uninvolved with the
subject matter of the request; may not identify with the agency’s
underlying mission; and are significantly less likely than their state-
law counterparts to know the personnel in the agency’s other of-
fices that are encompassed by the FOIA request. While this combi-
nation of factors can result in a relatively impersonal experience, it
does mitigate the possibility that agencies will base their decisions
on the identity of the requester, the subject matter of the request,
or the possibility that the requested records might embarrass a par-
ticular person within the agency.
The situation is entirely different with regard to most agencies
subject to state FOI laws. Here, the FOI process, even absent litiga-
tion, can be both personal and contentious. First, and most obvi-
ously, there is a greater likelihood that the agency personnel
http://www.ohionews.org/pdf/ocogspring2004se.pdf; Deborah Buckeley, Survey: Lit-
tle Regard Shown Concerning Free Information, SUNDAY ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec.
30, 2001, at 3A (“Of the 36 counties covered in a survey organized by The Associated
Press, fewer than half fully complied”); Jim Davenport, Many Officials Dodge Survey
About Public’s Right to Know: S. Carolina Effort Tests Compliance, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.),
Nov. 14, 2005 (“Ask many city or county officials in South Carolina about open meet-
ings and open records, and you’re likely to be met with fear or suspicion; and in some
places, officials are seemingly ignorant of the requirements of the law.”); Brendan
Farrington, State’s Open Record Laws Often Violated, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 22, 2008
(reporting that a random test by the Florida Society of Newspaper Editors of 163
public agencies in 56 counties resulted in “[a]lmost 43 percent of the offices fail[ing]
to comply with the [state’s FOI] law.”); Jon Sarche, Public Information Not Always Made
Available, Shows Survey, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN (Colo.), Oct. 13, 2006 (“[O]btaining
records can be an intimidating and disheartening process for members of the pub-
lic.”); Review: Illinois State Police Routinely Reject Requests for Public Information, ASSOC.
PRESS, Apr. 23, 2007, available at http://www.ap.org/foi/foi_050507a.html (reporting
that of the approximately 700 requests the state police received in 2006, 175 were
granted; 146 were denied; for 81 requests, none of the requested records were lo-
cated; and for the remaining (nearly 300) requests, there is no record that the state
police ever responded at all); Kendal Weaver, Open Records, Closed Doors, MOBILE REG.
(Ala.), June 1, 2003, at A1 (“The survey found widespread ignorance of Alabama’s
open records law and related opinions, with government officials frequently saying
they were unaware of statutes and legal standards. Others said members of the public
rarely ask for records.”). The NFOIC maintains an incomplete list of formal and infor-
mal audits of state FOI compliance on its website. See Freedom of Information Center,
Audits and Open Records Surveys, http://www.nfoic.org/audits-and-open-records-surveys
(last visited July 17, 2010).
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handling the FOI request will know the requester. While many
state FOI laws prohibit conditioning responses on the identity of
the requester,128 it would be unduly optimistic of human nature to
think that the identity of the requester never affects (for better or
worse) the manner in which a request is handled. At times, this can
have clear advantages—if, for example, the relationship is a good
one and the object of the request is uncontroversial. But for many
agencies, FOI requests are perceived with suspicion or outright
hostility,129 especially if the request is from particular individuals or
community groups known to be opposed to some aspect of the
agency’s policies. Moreover, unlike at the federal level, where the
distance (physical and metaphorical) between the FOIA officers
processing the request and the employees who created or maintain
the responsive records to the request can be advantageous to the
requester, the FOI decisionmaker at the state and/or local level
often is the target of the FOI request. This lack of impartiality can
create obvious hurdles for obtaining information that would be
embarrassing or otherwise damaging.130
In sum, FOI requests to state and local officials or entities can
be antagonistic affairs, with officials often reacting suspiciously to
what they may perceive—fairly or not—as acts of aggression, which
increases the likelihood, necessity, and expense of litigation.131
128 See, e.g., Maryland Public Information Act, MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-
614(c)(1) (2009).
129 See Davenport, supra note 127 (discussing suspicious reactions from public offi-
cials when asked for public records); Farrington, supra note 127 (same).
130 This can partly explain why many state officials have fought to keep email from
being considered public records reachable by FOI laws. See Tom Hester, Jr., States
Fight to Keep Officials’ E-mail From Open-Records Inspection, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 16, 2008,
available at http://www.ap.org/FOI/foi_031608a.html; Peter S. Kozinets, Access to the
E-mail Records of Public Officials: Safeguarding the Public’s Right to Know, 25 COMM. LAW.
17 (2007). For a discussion of how various states have resolved the issue of whether
emails are subject to their respective FOI laws, see Associated Press v. Canterbury, 688
S.E.2d 317, 325–331 (W.Va. 2009).
131 Litigating state FOI requests is similar to the federal FOIA, but there are some
key differences. For example, as discussed in Section III.C, it can be difficult to obtain
discovery in federal FOIA suits, but some state courts are more liberal in permitting
discovery in FOI cases. See, e.g., MD. CIR. CT. R. CIV. P. 2-411 (“Depositions – Right to
Take”) (establishing that litigants may, as a matter of right, take a deposition for the
purpose of discovery in all civil matters). On the other hand, and unfortunately for
requesters, the provisions for attorneys’ fees in state FOI laws tend to be less generous
than those provided by the federal FOIA. That said, all but seven states permit prevail-
ing parties to recover attorneys’ fees and litigation costs in a suit to contest a denial of
an FOI request under at least some circumstances. See Results and Criteria of BGA/
NFOIC Survey, supra note 126, at 1, 4–5 (comparing the attorneys’ fees provisions of
the 50 states’ FOI laws). Where available, fee awards can be substantial. See, e.g., Order
Granting Fees to Pls.’ Lawyers, Citizens for Sunshine v. City of Venice, No. 2008 CA
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B. Scope of Coverage
Another significant difference between the federal FOIA and
most state FOI laws—and one far more advantageous to reques-
ters—is the breadth of records each makes available for public in-
spection. Whereas the FOIA only applies to records over which an
“agency” of the Executive Branch has possession and control,132
most state FOI laws apply to all “public records,” usually a more
expansive class. Many states classify any record on file with a public
official as a “public record” obtainable through the state FOI law133
(subject to any applicable exemptions, of course). Thus, while the
federal FOIA explicitly does not apply to the federal courts or to
Congress,134 some state FOI laws do apply to legislative bodies135
8108 SC (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 25, 2009) (awarding $750,000 in attorneys’ fees and litiga-
tion expenses to the plaintiff non-profit organization in a suit under the Florida Pub-
lic Records Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01 through 119.15 (2009); and the Government In
the Sunshine Law, FLA. STAT. §§ 286.001 through 286.012 (2009)), available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/24688899; John Woolfolk, Public Records Settlement: $500,000
Deal Ends Suit Over Charges for Santa Clara County Maps, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct.
8, 2009, at 1B. The State of Washington’s Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 42.56 et seq. (2009), not only provides for mandatory attorneys’ fees to prevailing
parties, id. 42.56.550(4), but it also permits courts to impose a $5 to $100 per-day, per-
record fine for wrongly withheld records, payable to the requester who was forced to
bring suit. Id. This provision has led to sizeable fines recently. See, e.g., Yousoufian v.
Office of Sims, 200 P.3d 232, 240 n.12 (Wa. 2009) (noting that “[a] flea bite does little
to deter an elephant,” the Washington Supreme Court reversed a fee award of
$124,000 as too insubstantial to deter future misconduct); Gene Johnson, County Set-
tles Suit From Vote Challenger, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at B1 (“King County has
agreed to pay [a] conservative blogger [ ] $225,000 to settle a public-records lawsuit”).
132 See generally supra notes 10–11.
133 A good example of this is the Indiana Public Records Act, which defines
“[p]ublic record” as “any writing, paper, report, study, map, photograph, book, card,
tape recording, or other material that is created, received, retained, maintained, or
filed by or with a public agency and which is generated on paper, paper substitutes,
photographic media, chemically based media, magnetic or machine readable media,
electronically stored data, or any other material, regardless of form or characteristics.”
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-2(n) (West 2010). Some state FOI laws attempt to carve out
purely personal information from their definitions of “public records” by requiring
that the requested information be connected to the public’s business. See, e.g., Califor-
nia Public Records Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6252(e) (West 2010); R.I. Access to Pub.
Records Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(i) (2008).
134 This is apparently because when the FOIA was being debated, “Congress be-
lieved it made its deliberations and proceedings adequately subject to public observa-
tion, largely published its records, and otherwise was constitutionally authorized to
engage in information restriction in certain circumstances,” and lawmakers “also were
satisfied with the openness of federal court files and hearing rooms.” CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (up-
dated Aug. 31, 2009), at 2, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/97-71.pdf.
135 See, e.g., Conn. Freedom of Info. Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200(1)(A) (2009);
Idaho Pub. Records Act, IDAHO CODE § 9-337(13) (West 2010); Ill. Freedom of Info.
418 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:387
and the state judiciary.136 As discussed below, the expansive scope
of state FOI laws can be leveraged to gain access to information the
frequently-narrower federal FOIA does not provide.
C. Leveraging Vertical Federalism
An oft-cited objective of Our Federalism137 is that each sover-
eign acts as a check upon the other. In advocating for the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton assuaged fears
concerning the distance between the people and the central gov-
ernment by arguing that this distance:
will be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State
governments. The executive and legislative bodies of each State
will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every
department of the national administration; and as it will be in
their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system
of intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior
of those who represent their constituents in the national coun-
cils, and can readily communicate the same knowledge to the
people. Their disposition to apprise the community of whatever
may prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied
upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power.138
Hamilton may not have had access to government information in
mind, but the sentiment applies; indeed, state FOI laws can be a
Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/2(a) (West 2010); Utah Gov’t Records Access and
Mgmt. Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-103(11)(a)(ii) (West 2010).
136 Access to judicial records, unlike in most other contexts, has a clear constitu-
tional baseline: the Supreme Court has held that the public enjoys a qualified First
Amendment right “to inspect and copy judicial records” in criminal cases, Nixon v.
Warner Commc’n, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978), and has suggested in dicta that this right
extends to civil cases as well, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
580 n.17 (1980). Many states go beyond this constitutional minimum by providing
access to records relating to the judiciary’s administrative functions. See, e.g., Hawaii
Uniform Information Practices Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-3 (2008); Missouri Sun-
shine Law, MO. REV. STAT. § 610.010(4) (2009); Rhode Island Access to Public
Records Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 38-2-2(4)(i)(T) (2008). At least one state supreme
court has indicated that emails of judges, if “relate[d] to the conduct of the public’s
business,” are subject to disclosure. Assoc. Press v. Canterbury, 688 S.E.2d 317, 331
(W.Va. 2009).
137 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“‘Our Federalism’ . . . does not
mean blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’ any more than it means centralization of
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The
Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern-
ments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”).
138 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ernest Rhyce ed., 1937).
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useful way to monitor the activities of the federal government (and
vice-versa).
Under some circumstances—particularly in situations involv-
ing a high degree of federal-state cooperation, such as with law en-
forcement—certain records may be subject to both the federal
FOIA and the applicable state FOI law. Usually this is because the
records fall within the definition of both statutes; examples would
include records that a federal agency created and then sent to state
or local government agencies (or vice-versa), and records of com-
munications between the two maintained by both agencies (such as
email messages). As federal-state and federal-local cooperation has
increased in recent years the question of when state and/or local
agencies must disclose records created or disseminated by a federal
agency has arisen with increasing frequency.
When this issue has materialized, it is typically the federal
agency objecting to the state or local agency’s release of “federal”
information under the state FOI law.139 These objections take a
number of forms—everything from “informal persuasion”140 to in-
tervening in state FOI litigation141 and the promulgation of “emer-
gency” regulations.142 Federal agencies have also acted proactively
139 See Jennifer Bennett, Should Police Be More Like Doctors?: The Lessons of Medical
Informed Consent for National Security Partnerships at 3 (“[A]s federal agencies have in-
creasingly sought to involve state and local law enforcement in efforts to protect na-
tional security and enforce immigration law, they have also sought ways to shield these
collaborative endeavors from state and local laws regulating information disclosure.”)
(unpublished) (on file with author). This is not to suggest, however, that state and
localities do not also take the lead in arguing that federal law prohibits the disclosure
of information that they do not wish to disclose. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1318 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that the
Critical Infrastructure Information Act, 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1), did not prohibit the
county government’s disclosure of information that it had submitted to the federal
government); cf. Bennett, supra, at nn.13, 95–96 and accompanying text. The Santa
Clara case ultimately resulted in an agreement whereby the County agreed to pay
$500,000 in attorneys’ fees to the successful plaintiff. See Woolfolk, supra note 131.
140 See id. at 3–4.
141 See Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, Nos. CV084016692S,
CV094020945S, 2009 WL 4852114, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2009) (noting
that the United States had been granted intervenor status).
142 See Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization Service
Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19508, 19509 (Apr. 22, 2002) (codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. § 236.6); A.C.L.U. of N.J. v. County of Hudson, N.J., 799 A.2d 629
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 — an emergency regu-
lation promulgated by Attorney General John Ashcroft in direct response to the lower
court’s ruling in Hudson that counties holding detainees for the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service were required under state law to disclose information
about those detainees — preempted the state FOI law, such that the counties were
prohibited from releasing the requested information); but cf. Comm’r, Dep’t of.
Corr., 2009 WL 4852114, at *3 (holding that the regulation does not apply to infor-
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to shield certain information from state FOI laws, most typically by
inserting provisions into their contracts with state and local govern-
ments that purport to exempt certain records from state open
records laws.
These types of efforts by federal agencies are of dubious legal-
ity. There is no authority for the general proposition that a docu-
ment created by a federal agency or containing “federal”
information retains its “federal” character no matter where it is dis-
seminated—or even that there is such a thing as a “federal” record
or “federal” information.143 Nonetheless, federal agencies fre-
quently succeed in persuading state and local officials to deny re-
quests for records that the federal agency, for whatever reason,
does not want released under state law.144 Often, this is enough to
end the matter, either because requesters are not aware that this is
a potential state FOI violation, or because even if they do, their
only recourse is to file a lawsuit—an expensive and time-consum-
ing process that they understandably do not wish to undertake.
Nonetheless, when determined requesters have filed suit, they
have had successes. State and local defendant agencies in these law-
suits often try to defend nondisclosure by arguing that the state
FOI law either permits or mandates withholding the records. One
seemingly common argument is that the state FOI law somehow
incorporates the federal FOIA exemptions, such that the record
can (or must) be denied on the basis of a particular federal FOIA
exemption even where the state FOI law does not contain a compa-
mation about former detainees that were held in state and local jails, without opining
on its preemptive effect). See also Ronald K. Chen, Incarceration of Federal Prisoners After
September 11: Whose Jail is it Anyway?, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1335, 1361–67 (2004) (argu-
ing that the regulation constituted unconstitutional commandeering); Jose R. Al-
monte, Note, For the Sake of National Security: The Scope of the United States Attorney
General’s Authority in Light of 8 C.F.R. 236.6, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 817, 839–841 (2004)
(arguing that Attorney General did not have the authority to promulgate the regula-
tion); Bennett, supra note 139, at 6–12 (arguing that the regulation should be evalu-
ated in terms of its effects on democratic accountability).
143 Moreover, there are good reasons for being suspicious of federal attempts to
curtail states’ efforts to inform their citizens of the extent and nature of state-federal
cooperation on matters of public concern. See generally Bennett, supra note 139 (argu-
ing that the principles behind medical disclosure rules, although not perfectly analo-
gous, could be extended to evaluate when and how much information to disclose
about cooperation between the federal government and its state and/or local
counterparts).
144 This is not to say that the federal agency does not want the information released
at all; after all, the federal FOIA will typically apply to make at least some of the same
information accessible. More likely, the federal agency simply wants to control of the
process by requiring requesters to go through the federal FOIA.
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rable exemption.145 For example, the Connecticut Freedom of In-
formation Act provides that “unless otherwise prohibited by state
or federal law,” all public records shall be disclosed, subject to a
few discretionary exemptions.146 In an effort to resist disclosure of
records sent to it by a federal agency, the Connecticut State Police
argued that the “unless otherwise prohibited by state or federal
law” language incorporated the exemptions of the federal FOIA.147
The problem with this argument, however, is that the federal FOIA
exemptions do not prohibit the disclosure of anything; instead, they
are purely discretionary.148 On this basis, the Connecticut Freedom
of Information Commission rejected the argument,149 and its deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal.150
Similarly, in Maryland, a county sheriff participating in a local
immigration enforcement program151 run pursuant to an agree-
ment with the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) refused to disclose records related to the program that
were in his possession by arguing that the records belonged to the
federal government.152 Only after the requesting community group
filed suit153 did the sheriff relent, ultimately disclosing more than
145 See, e.g., Danaher v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, No. CVHHB084016067S, 2008
WL 4308212, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008) (rejecting this argument and
holding that Congress did not design the federal act exemptions to be mandatory
bars to disclosure); Letter from Andrew J. Murray, Supervising Cnty. Att’y, Anne Ar-
undel Cnty., Md., to MPIA requester CASA de Maryland, at 2 (Apr. 29, 2009) (stating
that MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-615(2) (West 2010)—which requires records’
custodians to deny requests under the Maryland Public Information Act for public
records when disclosure is prohibited by, inter alia, “federal statute or a regulation
that is issued under the statute and has the force of law”—requires denial of a re-
quested record because it allegedly would not be available under the federal FOIA),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/34514608.
146 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(a) (2009).
147 See Danaher, 2008 WL 4308212 at *2–3.
148 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also DOJ Guide to the FOIA, supra
note 8, at 685–709 (discussing discretionary agency disclosures).
149 Junta for Progressive Action v. Danaher, No. FIC 2007–416 (Conn. Freedom of
Info. Comm’n Nov. 6, 2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24688930.
150 See Danaher, 2008 WL 4308212.
151 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); CHRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTI-
TUTE, A PROGRAM IN FLUX: NEW PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FOR
287(g) (March 2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-March2010.pdf
(discussing the program’s development).
152 Compl. at 2-3, CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Frederick County Sheriff’s Office, No.
304960-V (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
22783444.
153 See id.; Nicholas C. Stern, Judge: Lawsuit Proceeds, FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Mary-
land), Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/
archives/display_detail.htm?StoryID=93831.
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2000 pages of records.154
A few months later, perhaps in reaction to similar records’ re-
quests in other states,155 ICE drafted new Memoranda of Agree-
ment (“MOA”) for agencies to sign.156 The new MOA contains a
provision, not present in the prior agreements, stating that:
Information obtained or developed as a result of this MOA is
under the control of ICE and shall be subject to public disclo-
sure only pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws,
regulations, and executive orders. Insofar as any documents cre-
ated by the [local law enforcement agency] contain information
developed or obtained as a result of this MOA, such documents
shall not be considered public records.157
Although this provision has yet to be challenged under a state FOI
law, state courts consistently reject similar attempts to contract
around state FOI laws,158 and it is difficult to imagine why they
would not do so here as well.159
154 See, e.g., 287(g) Training Materials, INA287.org, http://ina287.org/287g/287g-
training-materials.
155 See, e.g., Robert Boyer, Sheriff Working on 287(g) Request, TIMES-NEWS (Burlington,
N.C.), Mar. 28, 2009 (discussing how the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office was “con-
sulting with federal officials for clarification on the ACLU requests [under the state
FOI law] . . . to determine what they are allowed to release.”), available at http://www.
thetimesnews.com/news/sheriff-23776-information-aclu.html (last visited Nov. 11,
2010).
156 See Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces Stan-
dardized 287(g) Agreements with 67 State & Local Law Enforcement Partners (Oct.
16, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0910/091016washingtondc.htm.
157 Memorandum of Understanding from the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security and
the State of Ala., at 9 (October 15, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/
r_287galabamadepartmentofpublicsafety101609.pdf. Copies of all current and super-
seded MOAs are available in ICE’s electronic FOIA Reading Room at http://www.ice.
gov/foia/readingroom.htm (last visited July 17, 2010).
158 See, e.g., Bradley v. Saranac Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Mich.
1997) (“[T]he defendant school district cannot eliminate its statutory obligations to
the public merely by contracting to do so with plaintiff [Lansing Association of School
Administrators]. . . . No exemption provides for a public body to bargain away the
requirements of the FOIA.”); Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 768 N.W.2d 700, 718 (Wis. 2009) (“[W]e cannot accept [the Wisconsin State
Employees Union]’s argument that parties may, through the collective bargaining
process, contract away the public’s rights under the [Public Records Law]. To hold
otherwise would be contrary to the public interest, and would have the potential to
eviscerate the Public Records Law through private agreements.” (citations and quota-
tion marks omitted)); Comm’r, Dep’t of. Corr. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, Nos.
CV084016692S, CV094020945S, 2009 WL 4852114, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 17,
2009) (“The [Connecticut Department of Correction] may not contract away its statu-
tory obligations under [Connecticut’s] FOIA” through a “user agreement” between it
and the federal government governing use of a federal database).
159 See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ, supra note 151, at 2 (noting how this provision “potentially
conflict[s] with state and local public records laws and undermine[s] transparency.”).
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Attempts by federal agencies to prevent states and localities
from disclosing information are also of questionable legitimacy.160
When the federal government wishes to prohibit the disclosure of
certain information, there is an established procedure: Congress
passes a law. In Fiscal Year 2008, federal agencies relied on roughly
160 different statutory provisions to deny FOIA requests either in
part or in full,161 and these same provisions are properly used by
states and localities to deny state FOI requests as well.162
CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR CHANGE?
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to assist
FOIA requesters in obtaining the maximum amount of informa-
tion possible out of a transparency mechanism that suffers serious
flaws. In so doing, this Article, quite unintentionally, has taken a
tone that will likely strike some as pessimistic. Nonetheless, there
are reasons to hope that the situation will improve.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that transparency improved in
the early years of the Obama administration.163 Nonetheless, it re-
mains to be seen how far President Obama is willing to go in fulfil-
ling his pledge of a ushering in a new era of governmental
See also Travis Loller, ICE Wants to Limit Public Info About Detainees, KNOXNEWS.COM
(Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2009/sep/07/ice-wants-to-limit-
public-info-about-detainees/ (“A Tennessee sheriff is balking at renewing his depart-
ment’s participation in a program that lets local authorities enforce federal immigra-
tion laws because new rules could keep secret basic information about who’s being
detained.”); Travis Loller, Nashville Sheriff Signs Agreement With Immigration, TIMESFREEP-
RESS.COM (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2009/oct/09/nash-
ville-sheriff-signs-agreement-immigration/ (“Nashville Sheriff Daron Hall’s office has
agreed to coordinate the release of information with the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement office. If the federal agency wants to keep certain documents secret it
must show proof of a federal law or regulation or executive order authorizing that
withholding. . . . Hall had said he would not sign the document as it was and wanted
the guidelines for release of documents to conform with Tennessee law.”).
160 See Bennett, supra note 139.
161 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Info. Pol’y, Exemption 3 Statutes (Sept. 17,
2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption3-statutes.pdf. This list is compiled
each year at the direction of Congress. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(4) (2009).
162 Assuming that the state FOI law contains some provision providing that records’
custodians shall not release the records when doing so would violate federal law. See,
e.g., Connecticut Freedom of Information Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(a) (2009);
Maryland Public Information Act, MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-615(2)(ii)
(2009).
163 See OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY REPORT CARD ‘09: INDICATORS OF SE-
CRECY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2009), http://www.openthegovernment.org/
otg/SecrecyRC_2009.pdf; Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Openness has
Improved, but FOIA Reform Still Needed (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.rcfp.org/new-
sitems/index.php?i=11045.
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transparency,164 particularly following the high-profile (and highly-
embarrassing) publication of previously-confidential diplomatic
cables by WikiLeaks.165
A potentially exciting development for open-government pro-
ponents is the creation of the new Office of Government Informa-
tion Services (OGIS) within the National Archives and Records
Administration.166 This office, congressionally mandated by the
2007 OPEN Government Act,167 is tasked with serving as a liaison
between agencies and FOIA requesters, particularly when FOIA
disputes arise. Here again, it is too early to determine what effect, if
any, the OGIS will have on the administration of the FOIA. None-
theless, it does provide some hope that the gap between the FOIA’s
promise and its reality can be narrowed in the coming years.
164 See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and
Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 522 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1433815; but see Daniel J. Metcalfe, Sunshine Not So Bright:
FOIA Implementation Lags Behind, 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2009, at 5, 9
(applauding the general goal of transparency outlined by the Obama Administration,
but finding fault with its early implementation: “[W]hen the shouting’s over, what
matters most is how well those broad strokes are put into practice[ ] as a matter of
improved day-to-day administrative practice”).
165 See Mark Landler & J. David Goodman, U.S. Reassures Countries as Leaks Rattle
Relations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A14; Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked
Cables Offer a Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
166 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Information Privacy, Office of Government Informa-
tion Services Is Now Open, FOIA POST (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/oip/
foiapost/2009foiapost20.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010); see also Office of Govern-
ment Information Services, http://www.archives.gov/ogis (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
167 OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 10, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529-
30 (2007) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)).
